The pervasive nature of unconscious social information processing in executive control by Ranjani Prabhakaran & Jeremy R. Gray
REVIEW ARTICLE
published: 26       April 2012
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2012.00105
The pervasive nature of unconscious social information
processing in executive control
Ranjani Prabhakaran* and Jeremy R. Gray
Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA
Edited by:
Nicola De Pisapia, University of
Trento, Italy
Reviewed by:
Luiz Pessoa, Brown University, USA
Pamela K. Smith, University of
California, San Diego, USA
*Correspondence:
Ranjani Prabhakaran, Department of
Psychology, Yale University,
Box 208205, New Haven,
CT 06520-8205, USA.
e-mail: ranjani.prabhakaran@
yale.edu
Humans not only have impressive executive abilities, but we are also fundamentally
social creatures. In the cognitive neuroscience literature, it has long been assumed that
executive control mechanisms, which play a critical role in guiding goal-directed behavior,
operate on consciously processed information. Although more recent evidence suggests
that unconsciously processed information can also influence executive control, most of
this literature has focused on visual masked priming paradigms. However, the social
psychological literature has demonstrated that unconscious influences are pervasive, and
social information can unintentionally influence a wide variety of behaviors, including
some that are likely to require executive abilities. For example, social information can
unconsciously influence attention processes, such that simply instructing participants
to describe a previous situation in which they had power over someone or someone
else had power over them has been shown to unconsciously influence their attentional
focus abilities, a key aspect of executive control. In the current review, we consider
behavioral and neural findings from a variety of paradigms, including priming of goals
and social hierarchical roles, as well as interpersonal interactions, in order to highlight
the pervasive nature of social influences on executive control. These findings suggest that
social information can play a critical role in executive control, and that this influence often
occurs in an unconscious fashion. We conclude by suggesting further avenues of research
for investigation of the interplay between social factors and executive control.
Keywords: executive control, self-regulation, prefrontal cortex, visual masked priming paradigm, social priming,
social power, behavioral mimicry, impression management
INTRODUCTION
Our everyday lives require a tremendous amount of deliber-
ate behavioral regulation, including planning actions, inhibiting
response tendencies, and updating goals in light of new infor-
mation. These processes, known collectively as executive control,
are thought to rely on the prefrontal cortex (PFC) (see Miller
and Cohen, 2001 for a review) and to typically operate on con-
sciously processed information. The definition of “consciousness”
continues to serve as the topic of debate. Nonetheless, many the-
ories of executive control view consciously processed information
as that information within participants’ awareness that can trig-
ger intentional and deliberate behavioral regulation (see Jack and
Shallice, 2001; Hommel, 2007). Although several studies have
shown that unconsciously processed information, or informa-
tion processed outside of participants’ awareness, can influence
a wide variety of behaviors, including semantic (e.g., Markus and
Spitzer, 2000) and emotional (e.g., Whalen et al., 1998) process-
ing, many view executive control as a higher-order function that is
triggered only under conditions involving conscious awareness of
conflict (Atkinson and Shiffrin, 1968; Norman and Shallice, 1986;
Umilta, 1988; Dehaene and Naccache, 2001; Jack and Shallice,
2001). Additionally, the PFC has been suggested to serve as a neu-
ral correlate of consciousness, further underscoring the tight link
in the literature between this brain region, executive control, and
consciousness (Dehaene and Naccache, 2001; Rees et al., 2002;
Crick and Koch, 2003; Eimer and Schlaghecken, 2003). Indeed,
some have viewed the very idea of unconscious executive control
as an unlikely phenomenon (e.g., Dehaene and Naccache, 2001;
Jack and Shallice, 2001). However, more recent evidence suggests
that not only is unconscious executive control a plausible concept,
but it is also a commonly occurring phenomenon in our everyday
lives (Hommel, 2007; Suhler and Churchland, 2009).
Similar to the debate surrounding the definition of “conscious-
ness,” there is much controversy regarding the meaning of the
term “unconscious” (see Pessoa, 2005; Bargh andMorsella, 2008).
Whereas the cognitive neuroscience literature has largely focused
on unconscious information processing in terms of stimuli out-
side of awareness (i.e., subliminal stimuli), the social psychology
literature has emphasizedmental processes that function outside of
awareness (Bargh andMorsella, 2008; see also Nisbett andWilson,
1977). As noted by Bargh andMorsella (2008), subliminal stimuli
are weak and unnatural, thus making it difficult to assess the true
scope of unconscious processing using these types of stimuli. In
contrast, the social psychology literature has studied unconscious
processing through investigation of how stimuli within awareness
(i.e., supraliminal stimuli) can result in unconscious influences
on behavior through unintentional activation of mental processes
that operate outside of awareness. The results from these studies
suggest that unconscious processes have a surprisingly powerful
influence on our behavior (Bargh and Morsella, 2008).
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In the current review, we view unconscious executive con-
trol through the social psychological lens in order to highlight
how social information can lead to unintentional triggering and
engagement of executive control. First, we briefly review evi-
dence from studies in the cognitive neuroscience literature that
have used visual masked priming paradigms featuring sublimi-
nally presented visual stimuli to investigate unconscious visual
information processing in executive control. We then highlight
unconscious influences on executive control in the social domain,
revealed via paradigms involving social priming and social inter-
actions. It is important to note that there are both masked (i.e.,
subliminal) and unmasked (i.e., supraliminal) types of cognitive
(e.g., visual) and social priming paradigms. For the purposes of
the current review, we have focused on masked cognitive (visual)
priming paradigms and unmasked social priming paradigms, as
these methods have yielded several interesting findings regard-
ing unconscious influences on executive control. Although several
social psychology studies have demonstrated ways in which social
factors can unconsciously have an impact on executive control,
these findings have not received as much attention in the cog-
nitive neuroscience literature. We review these findings with the
aim of demonstrating the pervasive nature of unconscious social
influences on executive control, as well as suggesting the need
for further exploration of these influences at both behavioral and
neural levels.
VISUAL MASKED PRIMING PARADIGM
Several recent studies used a visual masked priming paradigm to
show that unconsciously processed visual information can trig-
ger executive control, reflected through behavioral interference
effects as well as activation of PFC. This paradigm involves pre-
sentation of a prime (e.g., a small shape) followed by a stimulus
(e.g., a large hollow shape) for which participants are asked to
make a response of some sort (e.g., press a button). One method
of masking the prime, known as metacontrast masking, involves
using a prime that has overlapping contours with the stimu-
lus and results in reduced visibility of the prime (see Lau and
Passingham, 2007; van Gaal et al., 2008, 2010; for examples of
this approach). The duration of the interval between the onsets
of the prime and stimulus can be altered such that a long inter-
val increases the visibility of the prime, whereas a short interval
renders the prime consciously imperceptible to the participant.
Typically, the prime is either congruent or incongruent with the
consciously perceptible stimulus in order to assess whether the
prime can induce conflict, even though it is below the level of
conscious awareness. In order to ensure that participants cannot
consciously detect the primes, participants typically perform a
separate discrimination task, in which they are asked to report
the identity of the masked prime, after the main experimental
procedure.
Interestingly, studies employing visual masked priming
paradigms have shown that unconsciously perceived informa-
tion can trigger executive control in a variety of different ways.
For example, Lau and Passingham (2007) had participants per-
form either a phonological or semantic task for a presented word
depending on the identity of an instruction figure shown prior
to the word. When presented with a square, participants had
to make a phonological judgment on the word, and when pre-
sented with a diamond, participants had to make a semantic
judgment. A masked prime was presented prior to the instruc-
tion figure that was either congruent or incongruent in identity
to the instruction figure. Lau and Passingham (2007) found that
incongruent masked visual primes led to establishment of the
incorrect task-set, reflected by impaired behavioral performance
as well as activation in neural regions associated with the incorrect
task and in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). These results
suggest that unconsciously perceived information can influence
executive control-related PFC activity, thereby suggesting that
consciousness is not a prerequisite for the activation of this neu-
ral region. Furthermore, as Lau and Passingham (2007) note,
the establishment of task-sets and goals is a critical component
of executive control (see also Miller and Cohen, 2001), which
indicates that unconsciously perceived information can have a
significant impact on higher-order behavior.
In addition to establishment of task-sets, studies employ-
ing visual masked priming paradigms have demonstrated that
unconsciously perceived visual information can trigger inhibitory
control mechanisms and related PFC activity (van Gaal et al.,
2008, 2010). For example, van Gaal et al. (2010) used a visual
masked priming version of a Go/No-Go task, in which partic-
ipants were instructed to press a button in response to a Go
stimulus (a white annulus), but to inhibit that response if a
No-Go prime (a white square) appeared before the Go stimulus.
The authors found that consciously imperceptible masked No-Go
primes were able to increase reaction times, suggesting triggering
of inhibitory control mechanisms that resulted in a slow-down in
responding, compared to masked Go primes (a white diamond).
Furthermore, masked No-Go trials were associated with activity
in brain regions associated with inhibitory control, namely infe-
rior frontal cortex and the pre-supplementary motor area. Thus,
unconsciously perceived information appears to be able to trigger
different types of executive control mechanisms and their PFC
neural substrate (see also Verbruggen and Logan, 2009; Wokke
et al., 2011).
SOCIAL INFLUENCES ON EXECUTIVE CONTROL
Although the studies discussed above provide compelling evi-
dence for unconscious triggering of executive control, they have
almost exclusively used visual masked priming paradigms to
demonstrate these effects. In order to obtain a more comprehen-
sive view of the relationship between unconscious processing and
executive control, it is important to investigate other domains that
can inform our understanding of this topic. The social psycholog-
ical literature has reported unconscious influences of the social
environment on a myriad of complex behaviors, including trait-
consistent behaviors (e.g., walking more slowly after presentation
of words related to the elderly stereotype; Bargh et al., 1996), goal-
pursuit (e.g., Aarts et al., 2004), and helping behavior (e.g., Garcia
et al., 2002; see Ferguson and Bargh, 2004 for a review). However,
the question remains as to whether social information can trig-
ger executive control in an unconscious fashion. In the current
review, we contend that not only is this a possible phenomenon,
but that unconscious social influences on executive control occur
in a pervasive manner in our everyday lives.
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Before we turn to the evidence supporting this conclusion, it is
useful to consider two questions. First, why might social infor-
mation trigger executive control? And second, why might this
influence occur in an unconscious fashion? Turning to the first
question, the frontal lobes of the primate brain have been sug-
gested to support two impressive domains of human cognition:
executive control as well as social cognition. The frontal lobes
are thought to serve as a key neural substrate for social cogni-
tion due to the need for behavioral regulation in a manner that
is sensitive to the current social context (see Adolphs, 2001, 2010
for reviews). Furthermore, it has been suggested that the evolu-
tion of the primate brain, particularly the expansion of the frontal
lobes, occurred in response to the social complexity of our envi-
ronments (Humphrey, 1976; Dunbar, 2003; Dunbar and Shultz,
2007). In light of the tight link between executive control and
social cognition, it is perhaps not too surprising that social infor-
mation can serve as a trigger of executive control. However, can
this influence occur without our awareness? Humans’ conscious
executive control resources, although impressive in the ability to
support behavior in both a flexible and goal-directed fashion, are
thought to be limited in nature. Thus, the ability for social infor-
mation to trigger executive control without our awareness may
allow us to automatically and efficiently suppress socially inap-
propriate response tendencies through practice over time, thereby
greasing the cogs of social interaction (Suhler and Churchland,
2009; van Gaal et al., 2010).
Given the ubiquitous nature of social influences in our envi-
ronment, there are several ways in which social information
can trigger executive control without our awareness. In the cur-
rent review, we consider behavioral and neural evidence from
paradigms involving social priming of task-sets and hierarchical
roles, as well as interpersonal interactions, and their unconscious
influences on executive control. We focus on evidence from two
types of techniques (see Bargh and Chartrand, 2000; Smith and
Galinsky, 2010 for reviews of these methods). First, we focus on
priming techniques involving the unconscious activation of par-
ticipants’ social knowledge and subsequent carry-over effects to
executive control tasks. Next, we focus on the use of social interac-
tions as a means of activating social knowledge and unconscious
carry-over effects affecting executive control in new situations.
At which levels of processing do these unconscious social
influences operate? In some cases discussed in this review,
social knowledge is activated unconsciously and participants also
remain unaware that this information influences executive con-
trol. In other cases, processing of social information and trigger-
ing of executive control in a social situation may be conscious,
but participants are not aware that this experience has an impact
on executive control in a seemingly unrelated situation. Thus,
although the level at which unconscious influences operate can
vary across studies, what the reviewed studies have in com-
mon is that they involve unconscious carry-over effects of social
information processing on executive control.
SOCIAL PRIMING
The social priming paradigm serves as a commonly used tech-
nique in the social psychology literature and involves the use
of a manipulation that is designed to prime, or activates, social
knowledge (e.g., a trait). The priming task can take one of many
different forms, such as filling out a questionnaire in which partic-
ipants are asked to provide their thoughts regarding a particular
social concept, solving a scrambled sentences task where certain
keywords are embedded within the sentence, or completing a lex-
ical decision task where keywords serve as a subset of the word
stimuli (see Bargh and Chartrand, 2000). Participants are then
asked to complete an ostensibly unrelated task, which in actuality,
serves as the dependent measure. The social priming technique
assesses the impact of implicit activation of social knowledge
on judgments and behaviors to the extent that participants are
unaware of the influence of the priming task on the main depen-
dent measure (Bargh, 1992; Bargh and Chartrand, 2000). The
level of awareness can vary depending on the type of priming
manipulation. For example, in the case of social conceptual prim-
ing, participants complete a task (e.g., scrambled sentences task)
involving words (e.g., “lonely,” “forgetful,” “wrinkle”) related to
a particular social concept (e.g., the elderly stereotype; see Bargh
et al., 1996). In this type of priming task, participants are aware
of the words and sentences. However, they are typically unaware
of the activation of social knowledge concepts as well as subse-
quent effects on a seemingly unrelated task. In the case of social
mindset priming, participants complete a task (e.g., filling out
a questionnaire asking them to reflect on a time when they had
power over someone else) that explicitly asks them to think about
a social concept (e.g., social power; Galinsky et al., 2003). In this
type of priming task, participants are aware of the activation of
social knowledge; however, they tend to remain unaware that this
activation persists to influence performance on a seemingly unre-
lated task (see Bargh and Chartrand, 2000; Smith and Galinsky,
2010 for reviews).
Social priming techniques share much in common with visual
masked priming paradigms in that both types of methods aim to
uncover unconscious influences on cognitive processes. However,
there are also important differences which should be noted. In
the case of visual masked priming paradigms, participants are
both unaware of having perceived the masked prime as well as its
subsequent effects on performance. In contrast, conceptual and
mindset forms of social priming often, although not necessarily,
involve conscious perception of the prime; however, the influence
of this knowledge on subsequent performance tends to operate
in an unconscious fashion. In order to ensure the success of the
experimenters’ cover story that the social priming and depen-
dent measure tasks were unrelated, participants are extensively
debriefed to assess their level of awareness at the conclusion of the
experiment. Although some have criticized this method of assess-
ing unconscious processing of social information (Orne, 1962;
see Ferguson and Bargh, 2004 for a review), the social priming
technique has been widely accepted as a means of assessing the
unconscious influences of social information on behavior.
SOCIAL PRIMING OF TASK-SETS AND GOALS
Social priming techniques have been used to demonstrate how the
activation of social knowledge can unconsciously affect executive
control. In a recent study, Goldfarb et al. (2011) had participants
first perform two blocks of the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935), a clas-
sic measure of executive control that assesses participants’ abilities
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org April 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 105 | 3
Prabhakaran and Gray Unconscious social influences on control
to resolve conflict between competing incompatible responses. In
this task, participants must name the ink color of a presented
stimulus whosemeaning is either congruent (e.g., “red” presented
in red ink), incongruent (“red” presented in blue ink), or neutral
(e.g., “xxxx” presented in red ink), with respect to the ink color.
Participants then completed an ostensibly unrelated question-
naire, which served as the social priming manipulation. In this
questionnaire, participants were asked to imagine a typical day
for a severely dyslexic individual as a means of priming a “do not
read” task-set. Following the priming manipulation, participants
performed two additional blocks of the Stroop task. Interestingly,
participants failed to show a significant Stroop effect (i.e., dif-
ference in reaction times for incongruent and congruent trials)
only for the block immediately following the dyslexia priming
manipulation. In a control social priming condition, participants
were asked to imagine a typical day for an individual with severe
mathematical difficulty, and no reduction in the Stroop effect was
found for this condition. Furthermore, debriefing indicated that
participants were not aware of the relationship between the social
priming manipulation and the Stroop task. This study suggests
that the dyslexia social priming manipulation temporarily acti-
vated a task-set and subsequent behavior in line with this task-set
in the absence of participants’ awareness. Thus, this study serves
as a social analog to Lau and Passingham (2007) in demonstrat-
ing that social priming, similar to the visual masked priming
paradigm, can establish a task-set in an unconscious fashion.
These results are in line with several previous studies demon-
strating that similar to task-sets, goals can be activated in an
automatic fashion, such that perceiving another individual pursu-
ing a particular goal can lead to activation of the same goal within
the perceiver (e.g., Aarts et al., 2004). This phenomenon of “goal
contagion” suggests that the social environment can exert a pow-
erful influence on our behavior, in ways that are often beyond
our awareness. Goals often involve self-regulation of one’s own
thoughts, actions, and emotions. For example, self-regulatory
abilities allow us to resist the temptation of a piece of cake when
one’s goal involves dieting, and enable us to study for an exam
rather than attend a party when one’s goal involves doing well
in a course (Ackerman et al., 2009). Self-regulation is thought to
rely on executive control resources, such as inhibitory control (see
Baumeister, 1998; Barkley, 2001).
The examples of self-regulation provided above seem to
involve difficult and deliberate choices that are conscious in
nature. How might social information trigger self-regulation
in an unconscious fashion? Although the bulk of research on
self-regulation has focused on intra-personal self-regulatory pro-
cesses, more recent studies suggest that inter-personal social
factors can influence the success of self-regulation, and that this
influence can occur in an unconscious fashion (see Fitzsimons
and Finkel, 2010 for a review).
For example, recent work has demonstrated that social prim-
ing manipulations can influence self-regulation. Ackerman et al.
(2009) had participants read either a story about a hungry
waiter/waitress who had to exercise self-control by not eating
the delicious food being served at the restaurant where he/she
worked, or a story about a waiter/waitress who was not hungry
and did not have to exercise self-control. Some participants were
instructed to adopt the perspective of the waiter/waitress, whereas
others were simply instructed to read the story. Participants then
performed seemingly unrelated tasks requiring self-regulation
in different domains, including indicating their willingness to
spend money on luxury goods as well as persistence in a lexical
generation task. Interestingly, the authors found that partici-
pants who adopted the perspective of the hungry waiter/waitress
demonstrated less self-control (e.g., less words generated in the
lexical generation task), suggesting depletion of self-regulatory
resources, compared to participants who adopted the perspec-
tive of the waiter/waitress who did not have to exercise self-
control. In contrast, participants who merely read about the
hungry waiter/waitress exercised greater self-control (e.g., more
words generated in the lexical generation task), indicating a goal-
contagion effect, compared to participants who read the story
that did not involve self-control. These results suggest that the
self-regulation of others can unconsciously influence our own
self-regulatory abilities, and that the nature of this impact can
depend on the extent to which we adopt the perspective of others.
In sum, social information can unconsciously trigger executive
control in the form of establishing task-sets and goals, as well as
guiding behavior accordingly.
PRIMING OF SOCIAL HIERARCHIES AND POWER DYNAMICS
In addition to task-sets and goals, social priming methods have
also been used to investigate the unconscious influence of social
roles on behavior. In our everyday lives, we tend to serve a
variety of social roles (e.g., teacher, student, parent, child, boss,
employee, etc.) depending on our relationships with other people
in our environments (Fiske, 1992). How do these roles guide our
behavior? And more specifically, can these roles trigger executive
control in the absence of our awareness? Below, we focus on social
hierarchical roles and their unconscious influence on executive
control.
Social hierarchies play an important role in our everyday
lives and have an impact on how we interact with other peo-
ple (Cummins, 2000). Those who have higher positions in social
hierarchies tend to wield more power, in that they exert greater
control over the behaviors of other people. These power dynamics
tend to influence where we direct our social attention, such that
individuals with less power tend to direct their attention to those
who control their fates (Fiske, 1993; cf. Overbeck and Park, 2006).
However, social power roles also have broader consequences on
the processing of information and guidance of behaviors that are
not explicitly social in nature. Indeed, power can be conceived of
as a psychological construct that upon activation, results in broad
downstream effects influencing how we think, feel, and behave
across a variety of social and non-social contexts (Galinsky et al.,
2003; Keltner et al., 2003; Smith and Galinsky, 2010). The psycho-
logical construct of power can be activated in either a conscious
or unconscious fashion with similar effects on behavior (Galinsky
et al., 2003). Smith and Galinsky (2010) noted that not only can
power influence behavior unconsciously, but these unconscious
influences also have far-reaching consequences in our daily lives.
For example, individuals primed with high power roles tend to
engage in more abstract thinking on both conceptual and per-
ceptual tasks (Smith and Trope, 2006) and are also more likely
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to engage in action across a broad variety of contexts, includ-
ing those unrelated to the possession of power (Galinsky et al.,
2003).
A few recent studies have shown that social power roles can
have an impact on executive control in the absence of participants’
awareness. Guinote (2007) investigated the impact of social power
roles on attentional control across a series of experiments. After
completing a manipulation designed to prime either high-power
or low-power social roles, such as describing a previous incident
in which participants had power over others (high power) or oth-
ers had power over them (low power), participants completed
seemingly unrelated tasks targeting the ability to focus on task-
relevant information in the presence of distracting task-irrelevant
information. For example, in one of these tasks, participants were
asked to indicate the orientation (i.e., upright or inverted) of pre-
sented objects by pressing either a left or right key on a keyboard.
The images of objects also contained salient task-irrelevant infor-
mation in the form of a handle on either the right or left side of
the object. On compatible trials, there was a match between the
correct button to be pressed and the side of the object on which
the handle appeared, whereas incompatible trials featured a mis-
match between these dimensions. As more powerful individuals
depend less upon situational constraints and have more con-
trol over their environment, Guinote (2007) hypothesized that
these people may be better able to allocate their attention to task-
relevant information and ignore task-irrelevant information. In
contrast, powerless individuals are more dependent upon exter-
nally defined constraints. Thus, they may need to simultaneously
process multiple cues due to uncertainty regarding which cues
are task-relevant or task-irrelevant. In support of these hypothe-
ses, Guinote (2007) found that low power-primed individuals’
reaction times were influenced by the compatibility of the han-
dle position with the hand used to make the response, indicating
that task-irrelevant information influenced their performance. In
contrast, high power-primed individuals’ reaction times did not
differ between compatible and incompatible trials. These results
suggest that high power-primed participants were better able to
allocate attention to goal-relevant information compared to low
power-primed participants.
Additional work has further explored the impact of social
power roles on executive control by focusing on the effects of
powerlessness on specific executive control mechanisms, includ-
ing updating, inhibiting, and planning (Smith et al., 2008). Smith
et al. (2008) primed social power roles through a variety ofmeans,
including assignment of participants to either superior or subor-
dinate roles for a purported future interaction that never took
place, a sentence-unscrambling task featuring words associated
with either low or high power, and a writing task in which par-
ticipants had to describe a situation in which they felt that they
had high or low power. Across separate experiments, partici-
pants then completed executive control tasks targeting updating
(n-back task), inhibition (Stroop task), or planning (Tower of
Hanoi task). Smith et al. (2008) consistently found that low
power-primed participants demonstrated poorer performance
(i.e., higher error rates in the n-back task, higher error rates for
incongruent trials in the Stroop task, greater number of moves
for conflict trials in Tower of Hanoi task) compared to high
power-primed participants for each specific executive control
mechanism that was targeted.
In order to further target the source of executive impairments
associated with low power, Smith et al. (2008) conducted an addi-
tional experiment in which participants performed one of two
variants of the Stroop task. In one of these variants, participants
were presented with a high proportion of congruent trials, where
goal maintenance demands are high due to the ability to success-
fully perform the task by reading the word, thereby neglecting the
goal to focus on the ink color, on the majority of trials. In the
other variant, participants were presented with a high proportion
of incongruent trials, thereby keeping goal maintenance demands
low from trial to trial, but increasing inhibition demands. The
authors found a difference in performance between high and low
power-primed participants only for the Stroop task variant with a
high proportion of congruent trials, with low power-primed par-
ticipants demonstrating higher error rates on incongruent trials
compared to high power-primed participants. Thus, the authors
contend that low power-primed participants’ poorer performance
stemmed from goal neglect, or difficulty in maintaining a goal for
a given task. Although participants in this study were randomly
assigned to high or low power priming conditions, the authors
contend that these findings have implications for social hierar-
chies within organizations. As those with low power must often
rely on others for instructions or directions, they may have fewer
opportunities to pursue their own goals. Smith et al. (2008) spec-
ulate that low power roles may further contribute to this disparity
through impairment of the very cognitive processes necessary for
goal maintenance and pursuit. Similar to Guinote (2007) find-
ings, these results suggest that social power roles unconsciously
influence executive control.
NEURAL CORRELATES OF SOCIAL POWER PRIMING
In addition to the behavioral evidence discussed above, neu-
ral evidence suggests that priming of social power roles can
unconsciously trigger PFC activity that may reflect engagement
of executive control mechanisms. For example, Boksem et al.
(2009) demonstrated that during a priming task in which par-
ticipants were asked to write about a previous situation where
they had either high or low power, increased EEG activity in left
(relative to right) PFC was associated with the high-power ver-
sus low-power priming task. Previous work has suggested that
both high-power roles (e.g., Keltner et al., 2003) and increased
left (relative to right) PFC activation (e.g., Sutton and Davidson,
1997) are associated with approachmotivation. Thus, the authors
speculate that high-power roles may engage PFC-mediated exec-
utive control mechanisms involved in goal-directed behavior and
facilitation of approach tendencies. Although these findings indi-
cate a link between social power roles and PFC activity, the extent
to which this PFC activity reflects recruitment of executive con-
trol mechanisms remains speculative in nature. However, Boksem
and colleagues have explored this issue further. Recent work by
Boksem et al. (2011) suggests that low power social roles may not
necessarily lead to a generalized deficit in executive control, but
rather, may influence the types of executive control mechanisms
that participants recruit. Boksem et al. (2011) found that partic-
ipants who were assigned a lower status in an interactive time
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estimation task demonstrated a stronger medial frontal negativity,
an event-related potential that serves as a measure of participants’
evaluation and monitoring of their performance, compared to
high-status individuals. As noted by the authors, these findings
suggest that lower status individuals are more likely to engage in
monitoring and adjustment of their performance, which stands
in contrast to the work of Guinote (2007) and Smith et al. (2008).
However, Boksem et al. (2011) suggest that rather than having
poorer executive control, low power individuals may rely on a
different executive control system that is more adaptive to their
more unpredictable environments. Specifically, the authors pro-
pose that low-status individuals may rely on a reactive control
system, which operates in a transient fashion and is triggered in
response to a stimulus. In contrast, high-status individuals may
rely on a proactive control system, which involves the active, sus-
tained maintenance of task-relevant information (see also Braver
et al., 2008).
Evidence from neuroimaging studies suggests the sensitivity
of PFC to cues associated with social power roles. Marsh et al.
(2009) had participants perform a gender discrimination task
for photographs of male and female actors depicting high-status
(e.g., low brow position) and low-status (e.g., high brow posi-
tion) cues. Marsh et al. (2009) found increased activity in right
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) and left DLPFC asso-
ciated with implicit processing of high-status versus low-status
cues. Marsh et al. (2009) suggest that this activation may reflect
the role of PFC in guiding behavior in an appropriate fashion
given the current social context. Additionally, neuroimaging evi-
dence suggests the sensitivity of PFC to social power roles, even
when they are irrelevant to task performance. Zink et al. (2008)
created an explicit social hierarchy in the context of a game sit-
uation, in which participants simultaneously played a game with
one of two other simulated players, one of whom was superior in
status to the participant and the other who was inferior in sta-
tus. The game was non-competitive in nature such that status was
irrelevant to the outcome of the game. Interestingly, the authors
found greater DLPFC activity when participants viewed the pic-
ture of a superior versus inferior-status player, and this difference
in DLPFC activity was not observed in a nonsocial version of the
task where participants played with non-human computer play-
ers. The authors suggest that DLPFC plays a role in the processing
of social hierarchical information.
In sum, results from EEG, ERP, and fMRI studies demon-
strate that social power roles can trigger activity in DLPFC, even
when those roles are not task-relevant. In light of the abundant
evidence suggesting the critical role of DLPFC in supporting exec-
utive control, the studies discussed above indicate the sensitivity
of this executive control-related neural region to social hierar-
chies. Together with the behavioral results discussed above, these
studies suggest that social power roles have far-reaching conse-
quences for our behavior, and that these influences often occur
outside of our awareness. It is important to note that the major-
ity of these studies have speculated rather than explicitly tested
that observed PFC activity reflects engagement of executive con-
trol mechanisms. However, given that the PFC’s role in social
cognition has been suggested to consist of the engagement of
executive control to regulate social behaviors (see Adolphs, 2001),
these speculations do not seem unwarranted. Nonetheless, fur-
ther investigation is clearly necessary in order to elucidate the
specific contributions of PFC to social power dynamics.
SOCIAL INTERACTIONS
The studies reviewed thus far have demonstrated how the acti-
vation of social knowledge can have important downstream con-
sequences for our abilities to use executive control in seemingly
unrelated situations. These studies have tended to employ subtle
priming manipulations, such as reading about other individu-
als or performing a simple scrambled sentences task. Although
impressive in terms of their subtlety, one could argue that these
types of manipulations do not truly capture the social nature of
our environments.
As social creatures, we spend a great deal of time interacting
with others. Can these social interactions affect executive control?
And can this influence occur in an unconscious fashion? Below,
we review evidence suggesting that social interactions can trig-
ger executive control in surprising ways, and that this influence
occurs without our awareness more often than we may think.
The results of several studies indicate that not only the types
of social interactions, but also the types of interaction partners,
can unconsciously influence executive control. In particular, we
consider how subtle aspects of our social interactions, such as
interpersonal coordination and behavioral mimicry, as well as the
gender and race of our interaction partners can trigger executive
control in the absence of our awareness.
TYPES OF SOCIAL INTERACTIONS
High-maintenance social interactions
Our daily lives often involve working on tasks with other individ-
uals. For example, we may work with others in order to design
an experiment or write a paper at work, or cook a meal with
friends at home. Although working with others can increase effi-
ciency, sometimes social coordination is inefficient and taxing in
nature. Recent work suggests that the nature of social interactions
involving coordination can affect self-regulation, which as noted
above, is thought to rely on executive control mechanisms. Due to
the limited nature of self-regulatory resources, our deployment of
these resources comes at a cost, such that executive control may be
depleted for subsequent situations requiring the same resources
(Muraven and Baumeister, 2000; Baumeister, 2002; cf. Job et al.,
2010). Thus, the depletion of these resources due to an effort-
ful social interaction can result in fewer resources available for
subsequent situations, even those that are non-social in nature.
Under this hypothesis, recent work has investigated the impact
of high-maintenance social interactions, which involve inefficient
social coordination, on self-regulation. Finkel et al. (2006) had
participants first engage in either a high- or low-maintenance
interaction with a confederate in the context of a collaborative
task. In high-maintenance interactions, confederates impeded
social coordination (e.g., deliberately making errors when giv-
ing directions to the participant), whereas in low-maintenance
interactions, confederates facilitated social coordination (e.g.,
making no errors when giving directions and remaining in
sync with the participant). After the social interaction, partic-
ipants performed ostensibly unrelated tasks designed to assess
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self-regulatory abilities, such as preference for easy versus chal-
lenging tasks, and performance on an anagram task and Graduate
Record Examination questions. Across studies, the authors found
that high-maintenance social interactions resulted in impaired
self-regulation on subsequent unrelated tasks. Furthermore, this
effect was not mediated by conscious awareness of the high-
maintenance nature of the social interaction, which was assessed
via participants’ self-reports of subjectively experienced deple-
tion, liking for their interaction partner, or mood. The authors
suggest that this effect may stem from the depletion of self-
regulatory resources during high-maintenance interactions, as
individuals may need to resist the temptation to discontinue
the interaction or respond in socially inappropriate ways. These
results suggest that high-maintenance social interactions can
deplete self-regulatory resources without our awareness, and that
this impact extends to subsequent unrelated situations that also
rely on self-regulatory abilities.
Behavioral mimicry
Behavioral mimicry serves as another example of an unconscious
influence of social interactions on executive control. We tend
to mimic the behaviors of others, such as imitation of others’
physical gestures and mannerisms, and this can facilitate social
interactions (Chartrand and Bargh, 1999; Chartrand and Dalton,
2009). Behavioral mimicry is thought to operate via implicit
schemas activated in an automatic and context-dependent fash-
ion (Bavelas et al., 1986; Bernieri, 1988; Chartrand and Bargh,
1999; Lakin et al., 2003). However, situations in which mimicry
violates social norms disables the use of schemas, and as a result,
social interactions proceed in a more effortful fashion.
Dalton et al. (2009) examined the cognitive consequences of
violation of mimicry norms in a series of experiments, with a
focus on the impact of behavioral mimicry on the availability of
executive and self-regulatory resources (see also Finkel et al., 2006,
Experiment 5). In one experiment, Dalton et al. (2009) investi-
gated the impact of social power roles, in the context of social
interactions, on executive control. As noted above, priming of
social power roles can trigger executive control. Power dynamics
also provide a set of social norms that tend to guide behavior in
ways appropriate to one’s social role. For example, those people
in social roles associated with less power, such as workers, tend to
mimic the behavior of those people in social roles associated with
more power, such as leaders (Cheng and Chartrand, 2003). The
extent to which these norms are followed can have downstream
effects on executive control, and strikingly, these effects can occur
in an unconscious fashion. Thus, going beyond the priming of
power roles, power dynamics can unconsciously affect executive
control in the context of social interactions with others.
Dalton et al. (2009) manipulated social roles by assigning some
participants to be leaders for a future interaction which did not
take place and was only mentioned as a means of manipulat-
ing social roles. Other participants were assigned to be workers,
where a confederate played the complementary social role (e.g.,
a worker, if the participant had been designated as a leader).
Participants and confederates then completed a joint photo
description task, where the confederate either did or did not
behaviorally mimic the participant. For the condition featuring
behavioral mimicry, the confederate mimicked the postures, ges-
tures, andmannerisms of the participant, including crossing arms
and legs, as well as touching one’s own face and hair. For the
no-mimicry condition, the confederate remained behaviorally
out of sync with the participant, such that there was a con-
stant mismatch in physical behaviors between the confederate
and participant throughout the joint task. The authors found
that when behavioral mimicry violated social norms (i.e., the
leader confederate behaviorally mimicked the worker partici-
pant, or the worker confederate did not behaviorally mimic the
leader participant), participants demonstrated greater interfer-
ence (i.e., larger difference in reaction times between incongruent
and neutral trials) on a subsequent Stroop task. Furthermore,
none of the debriefed participants indicated awareness of being
mimicked during the photo description task, suggesting that the
impact of behavioral mimicry on executive control occurred in
an unconscious fashion. These results expand on the findings
of Finkel et al. (2006) to demonstrate the powerful impact of
inefficient or counter-normative social interactions on executive
control, even in situations where participants are not aware of the
high-maintenance nature of the social interaction.
IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT AND IDENTITY OF INTERACTION
PARTNERS
Another important aspect of our everyday lives concerns how
we present ourselves to others. Self-presentation (i.e., impres-
sion management) refers to the processes involved in managing
the impression that one presents to others, and has important
consequences for several aspects of our daily lives, including
making friends, developing romantic relationships, getting a job,
and acquiring other social and financial rewards or outcomes
(Baumeister, 1982; Leary and Kowalski, 1990; Vohs et al., 2005).
Importantly, impression management can differ depending on
the social context and can also vary in terms of the level of aware-
ness involved (see Baumeister, 1982; Schlenker andWeigold, 1992
for reviews). In familiar situations, such as talking with a good
friend, we tend to rely on well-practiced behaviors that can pro-
ceed in an automatic, effortless fashion. However, in unfamiliar
or novel situations, such talking to the president of the company
where we work, we may have to rely on more effortful processing
in order to effectively control our behaviors to be in line with the
impression that we wish to convey.
Such effortful impression management has been suggested to
rely on self-regulatory resources and to have important conse-
quences for subsequent situations reliant on self-regulation (Vohs
et al., 2005). In order to test this hypothesis, Vohs et al. (2005)
conducted a series of experiments in which participants first
engaged in effortful, counter-normative self-presentation situa-
tions, such as presenting oneself in a modest fashion to a stranger
or in a self-enhancing fashion to a friend. Participants then com-
pleted a variety of seemingly unrelated measures designed to
assess self-regulatory abilities, such as persistence on a set of math
problems and suppression of emotional responses while watching
an upsetting video. Across these experiments, the authors found
that self-presentation in unfamiliar or counternormative situa-
tions resulted in less self-regulatory ability on a subsequent task.
Furthermore, the authors tested whether this relationship held in
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the other direction. For example, participants first performed the
Stroop task, followed by a seemingly unrelated task involving a
social interaction. The authors found that taxing self-regulatory
resources in this manner led to inappropriate self-presentation in
a subsequent social interaction. In sum, these experiments pro-
vide evidence suggesting that impression management can affect
executive control in an unconscious fashion.
Impression management: opposite-sex interactions
Several studies have elaborated on the work of Vohs et al. (2005)
to show how impression management depending on the iden-
tity of interaction partners affects executive control in subsequent
tasks. For example, for heterosexual individuals, interacting with
a member of the opposite sex can often involve high levels
of impression management concerns (Baumeister, 1982; Bruch
et al., 1989). Karremans et al. (2009) recently investigated the
impact of impression management associated with opposite-sex
interactions on performance on executive control tasks assessing
updating (n-back task) as well as task-switching and inhibition
(modified Simon task). In two experiments, the authors found
that heterosexual male participants who engaged in a brief inter-
action with an opposite-sex confederate demonstrated poorer
performance on subsequent executive control tasks compared
with male participants who interacted with a same-sex confed-
erate. It is important to note that similar to the experiments
conducted by Vohs et al. (2005), Karremans et al. (2009) led
participants to believe that the social interaction and executive
control task components of the experiment were unrelated, sug-
gesting that the influence of the social interaction on executive
control operated on an unconscious level.
Interestingly, recent work shows that even the presence of
another individual within a specific socio-evaluative context can
affect executive control. Dreisbach and Bottcher (2011) had
female participants perform a flanker task (Eriksen and Eriksen,
1974), in which participants were asked to indicate the direc-
tion of a central left or right pointing arrow that was flanked by
arrows pointing in either the same (compatible trials) or different
(incompatible trials) direction. Each trial was preceded by a pic-
ture of either a landscape or an attractive woman. Concurrently,
a fellow student or the romantic partner of the participant eval-
uated the attractiveness of either the landscapes or the pictures
of women. The fellow student or romantic partner performed
the evaluation task in the same room as the participant, and
was given verbal instructions for the evaluation task such that
the participant could hear the instructions. The authors found
that participants demonstrated impaired performance on incom-
patible flanker trials (those trials that invoke executive control)
only following pictures of attractive women, but not landscapes.
Furthermore, this impairment was only observed in situations
where a fellow student or the participant’s romantic partner con-
currently rated the attractiveness of the pictures of women, but
not landscapes. The authors interpret the selectivity of these
results as stemming from participants’ affective reaction to con-
current evaluation of socially threatening stimuli. Thus, this study
suggests the importance of the social context within which we
exert executive control. As the authors note, humans typically
tend to operate within a social context. Consequently, our social
environments are likely to have a pervasive influence on our abil-
ities to exert executive control, even in tasks that are seemingly
unrelated to the current social context.
Impression management: interracial interactions
In addition to the sex of our interaction partners, the work
of Richeson and colleagues demonstrates that the race of one’s
interaction partner can also trigger executive control. Richeson
and Shelton (2003) found that participants with higher levels of
implicit racial bias, assessed via the Implicit Association Test (IAT;
Greenwald et al., 1998), demonstrated poorer executive control
(i.e., greater Stroop interference) following an interracial inter-
action than after an interaction with someone of the same race.
These results suggest that interracial interactions can have an
impact on executive control in seemingly unrelated situations
where race is no longer a part of the social context.
In a subsequent study, Richeson et al. (2003) investigated the
neural mechanisms underlying the relationship between racial
bias, interracial interactions, and executive control. Participants
first took part in a behavioral testing session, in which they
completed the IAT as well as the Stroop task, following either a
same-race or inter-racial interaction with a confederate. At least
two weeks later, participants were contacted by a different experi-
menter and asked to take place in an ostensibly unrelated fMRI
study, in which they viewed unfamiliar black and white faces
in the context of a spatial perception task. The authors found
that neural activity in lateral PFC and the anterior cingulate cor-
tex (ACC) in response to viewing pictures of unfamiliar black,
but not white, faces predicted participants’ Stroop interference
effects following an interracial, but not a same-race, interaction.
Importantly, the authors demonstrated that lateral PFC activity
was a significant mediator of the relationship between racial bias
scores and Stroop interference, suggesting that interracial interac-
tions may temporarily tax executive control abilities supported by
PFC, thus leading to impaired Stroop performance.
Although the results of the studies discussed above suggest that
interracial interactions can impact executive control, the nature
of this influence remains unclear. That is, why might interra-
cial interactions lead to impaired executive control? In follow-up
work, Richeson and Trawalter (2005) showed that this relation-
ship appears to stem from the depletion of self-regulation. In one
experiment, the authors increased the self-regulatory demand of
interracial interactions, by providing participants with false neg-
ative feedback about the extent of prejudice revealed by their IAT
scores, prior to having the participants engage in the interaction.
This led to greater subsequent Stroop interference compared to
a control condition in which participants were provided with
false negative feedback about their IAT scores that was unre-
lated to prejudice. In a separate experiment, the authors found
that reducing self-regulatory demand, accomplished by provid-
ing participants with a script for a discussion about a racially
sensitive topic with a black confederate, resulted in less subse-
quent Stroop interference compared to a control condition in
which participants were not provided with a script. Importantly,
the manipulation of self-regulatory demands had an impact on
Stroop performance only after interracial, but not same-race,
interactions. This work suggests potential mechanisms through
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which interracial interactions may trigger and deplete executive
control, namely via anxiety or concern regarding the appear-
ance of being prejudiced (see also Vorauer et al., 2000; Blascovich
et al., 2001). Although the majority of the work of Richeson and
colleagues has focused on racial bias in white participants, it is
important to note that they have also found a depleting impact of
implicit racial bias on executive control in black participants fol-
lowing interracial interactions (Richeson et al., 2005). In sum, the
work of Richeson and colleagues suggests that interracial inter-
actions can serve as an unconscious trigger of executive control
mechanisms, leading to a temporary depletion of these resources.
Interestingly, interracial interactions can also trigger execu-
tive control through violation of social mimicry norms (Dalton
et al., 2009). As same-race interactions are typically associated
with a greater extent of behavioral mimicry compared to inter-
racial interactions, those situations that feature a violation of
these mimicry norms can trigger executive control. For example,
Dalton et al. (2009) found that same-race interactions featuring a
lack of behavioral mimicry and inter-racial interactions featuring
higher levels of behavioral mimicry than normal were associated
with greater subsequent Stroop interference. These results suggest
that counter-normative behavioral mimicry triggered executive
control depending on the correspondence between the level of
behavioral mimicry and the race of one’s interaction partner.
The results discussed thus far may lead one to think that inter-
racial interactions inevitably lead to negative consequences for
executive control. Thus, these findings may serve as cause for
concern. However, it is important to note that not all interracial
interactions necessarily lead to depletion of executive control. In
particular, the context in which these interactions occur has the
potential to influence their impact on executive control (Babbitt
and Sommers, 2011; see also Trawalter et al., 2009). Babbitt and
Sommers (2011) manipulated the interaction context for interra-
cial and same-race (all white) dyads to either have a social focus or
a task focus. Following the interaction, participants completed the
Stroop task as a measure of executive control. The results of this
study indicate that the task-focus condition led to a significant
decrease in the extent of executive control depletion (i.e., smaller
Stroop interference effects) compared to the social-focus condi-
tion for black participants in interracial dyads. Although a similar
pattern was observed for whites, this effect did not reach signif-
icance. In follow-up experiments, Babbitt and Sommers (2011)
found that manipulation of interaction context led to changes in
self-reported concerns. In particular, white participants reported
less concern about coming across as prejudiced, and black par-
ticipants reported less concern about experiencing prejudice in
the task-focus versus social-focus conditions. This study provides
evidence suggesting that the framing or context of interracial
interactions can have important downstream consequences for
executive control. In particular, these results suggest an effec-
tive means of reducing the tendency of interracial interactions to
deplete executive control.
SOCIAL INTERACTIONS: POSITIVE IMPACT ON EXECUTIVE CONTROL?
Babbitt and Sommers (2011) suggest one possible method of
reducing the depleting effects of interracial interactions on exec-
utive control. But do social interactions always result in the
depletion of executive control resources? Using the metaphor
of self-regulatory or executive control resources as a muscle
(Muraven and Baumeister, 2000), are there situations in which
exercising this muscle can lead to facilitation, rather than fatigue,
in subsequent situations reliant on executive control? If so, what
types of situations lead to boosts in executive control?
Given the reliance of perspective-taking abilities on executive
control (see Decety and Jackson, 2004 for a review), recent work
has investigated the hypothesis that social situations that encour-
age perspective-taking lead to boosts in executive control. Ybarra
et al. (2011) primed participants with either cooperative or com-
petitive social goals via description of a future social interaction in
either cooperative or competitive terms. This future interaction,
in fact, never took place and was used only to prime partici-
pants’ tendency to engage in perspective-taking. Participants then
engaged in a 10min social interaction with a confederate, after
which they completed a seemingly unrelated measure of execu-
tive control (Trail Making Test). Ybarra et al. (2011) showed that
participants primed with a cooperative social goal demonstrated
greater executive control performance compared to those partici-
pants in the competitive condition and a no-intervention control
condition. Across two follow-up experiments, Ybarra et al. (2011)
showed that competitive interactions can also lead to facilitated
executive control, provided that participants are encouraged to
engage in perspective-taking during these interactions. Based on
these results, the authors suggest that situations that encourage
perspective-taking can lead to boosts in executive control, per-
haps by “warming up” this shared neural resource. However, the
authors suggest that challenging social interactions (e.g., interra-
cial interactions for those with higher racial bias) or those that
result in withdrawal and a focus on the self rather than on the
perspective of another, can lead to depletion of executive control
resources.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
As noted in the Introduction, much of the cognitive literature
on unconscious information processing in executive control has
focused on evidence from visual masked priming paradigms. In
this review, we have discussed evidence from several social psy-
chology studies demonstrating that in addition to stimuli outside
of awareness, unconscious information processing can also refer
to mental processes that operate without awareness (see Bargh and
Morsella, 2008). In particular, we have considered converging evi-
dence from the social domain and highlighted both the pervasive
and unconscious influences of social factors on behavioral and
neural correlates of executive control. These social factors rep-
resent common elements of our everyday lives, including social
power roles as well as interactions involving social coordina-
tion, behavioral mimicry, and interactions with individuals of the
opposite sex and other races.
In addition to recognizing that social factors can unintention-
ally influence executive control, it is important to consider how
this may occur. The studies we have discussed in this review sug-
gest some mechanisms. Social information can unintentionally
trigger the establishment of task-sets (e.g., Goldfarb et al., 2011)
and pursuit of goals, including those involving self-control (e.g.,
Ackerman et al., 2009). These task-sets and goals, established via
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social means such as reading about another individual or try-
ing to adopt someone’s perspective, can then guide behavior in
a goal-consistent fashion. Information pertaining to social hier-
archies and social power roles can also unconsciously influence
executive control abilities, such as active maintenance of task- or
goal-relevant information (e.g., Guinote, 2007; Smith et al., 2008)
and related PFC activity (e.g., Boksem et al., 2009). As noted by
Miller and Cohen (2001), the establishment and maintenance of
goals and subsequent biasing of behavior in line with these goals
serves as the principal function of PFC.
Another way in which social information can affect execu-
tive control involves the depletion of self-regulatory resources. As
suggested by Vohs et al. (2005); Finkel et al. (2006); and Dalton
et al. (2009) social interactions proceeding in an inefficient or
counter-normative fashion may deplete self-regulatory resources.
As a result, this depletion can have an impact on subsequent
tasks dependent on these same self-regulatory resources, such as
executive control tasks. Work by Richeson and colleagues (e.g.,
Richeson et al., 2005) has also shown that interracial interactions
may deplete self-regulatory resources, perhaps due to concerns
about appearing prejudiced, and lead to subsequent executive
control impairments. Furthermore, activity in PFC appears to
mediate this relationship (Richeson et al., 2003).
The studies discussed in this review have demonstrated sev-
eral ways in which social factors can influence executive control
in an unconscious fashion. However, they also suggest additional
questions and avenues for further research. We offer two such
avenues here. First, which factors determine whether a social
interaction impairs or boosts executive control? Preliminary evi-
dence suggests that interactions involving perspective-taking can
lead to facilitation of executive control (Ybarra et al., 2011).
This finding suggests the potential for using perspective-taking
manipulations to offset the self-regulatory depletion caused by
effortful interactions, such as during a high-maintenance inter-
action, or when interacting with someone of a different race.
Further research is necessary to determine other social factors that
can boost executive control. Dalton et al. (2009) have suggested
that behavioral mimicry in the context of close relationships may
serve to replenish executive control resources. The extent to which
perspective-taking and behavioral mimicry can boost or replen-
ish executive control should be tested across a variety of different
social contexts, as this could have important consequences for the
successful utilization of executive control and self-regulation in
our daily lives. Additionally, further research is needed on the
neural correlates of how social interactions affect executive con-
trol. Previous neuroimaging studies have largely been unable to
investigate the effects of naturalistic social interactions on neu-
ral activity due to the constraints of functional neuroimaging
methods. However, recent work has introduced novel methods
for implementing online, face-to-face social interactions during
fMRI scanning (Redcay et al., 2010), and these methods holds
great promise for future work investigating the impact of social
interactions on executive control.
Second, what is the duration of the impact of social priming
and social interactions on executive control? In the case of the
social priming technique, Goldfarb et al. (2011) found an impact
on Stroop performance only in the block immediately follow-
ing the dyslexia priming manipulation. This suggests that social
priming effects are of short duration and may not have as far-
reaching consequences as a taxing social interaction. In further
support of this idea, evidence from the power priming litera-
ture suggests that priming of power constructs yields similar, but
less impactful, behavioral consequences compared with the actual
possession of power (see Smith and Galinsky, 2010 for a review).
The majority of studies employing social interactions have tended
to investigate their impact on executive control for tasks immedi-
ately following the social interaction. Thus, the duration of these
effects requires further study in order to determine the extent of
their influence.
Additionally, it is important to note that although social infor-
mation can unconsciously trigger executive control, this does not
mean that all of our behavior is beyond our conscious control
(see Suhler and Churchland, 2009). Rather, it is likely that both
consciously and unconsciously processed information can trigger
executive control depending on the situation, and that both con-
sciously and unconsciously triggered control work in concert to
efficiently guide behavior. Further research is clearly necessary to
elucidate the similarities and differences between conscious and
unconscious control mechanisms. In addition, further specifica-
tion of the types of factors that can influence executive control will
allow for identification of ways to combat these influences, par-
ticularly when they lead to undesirable behavioral consequences
(e.g., depletion of self-regulatory resources).
Consideration of the unconscious influence of social factors on
executive control holds a great deal of promise for future research.
Indeed, based on the findings discussed in this review, it is criti-
cal to ask not only whether social information can unconsciously
influence executive control, but also how these effects occur. In
his seminal article on the social function of intellect, Humphrey
(1976) described studying the recovery of vision in a rhesus mon-
key that had been kept in a cage in the laboratory. Although
the monkey’s recovery was somewhat limited within the labo-
ratory, she showed a great improvement in spatial vision when
she was allowed to spend time outdoors. Humphrey thus notes
that “The limits on her recovery had been imposed directly by
the limited environment in which she had been living” (1976,
p. 308). In a similar fashion, a great deal of experimental psy-
chological research involves testing participants’ executive control
abilities in isolation within the “cage” of the laboratory. However,
in our daily lives, we are nearly always engaged in a social con-
text. In order to better understand executive control processes, we
must move beyond only studying participants in the limited social
environment of the laboratory, and also consider the influence of
social factors present in our everyday lives. Thus, greater consider-
ation of the interplay between social factors and executive control
may allow us to gain a deeper understanding of the mechanisms
underlying regulation of human behavior.
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